The foreign policy of the United States is guided by deeply held beliefs, few of which are recognized, much less subjected to rational analysis, Christopher J. Fettweis writes in this, his third book. He identifi es the foundations of those beliefs -fear, honor, glory, and hubris -and explains how they have inspired poor strategic decisions in Washington. He then proceeds to discuss their origins. The author analyzes recent foreign policy mistakes, including the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Vietnam war, and the Iraq war, and he considers the decision-making process behind them, as well as the beliefs inspiring those decisions. The American government's strategic performance, Professor Fettweis argues, can be improved if these pathological beliefs are acknowledged and eliminated. This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
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It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. Collective amnesia descends upon society following foreign policy disasters. People everywhere seem to exhibit symptoms of short-term memory loss; at the very least, few appear particularly eager to discuss what just occurred. Enterprising journalists might undertake fi rst drafts of history, but for the most part the event barely registers in the popular imagination. For a certain period of time, one whose length is directly related to the magnitude of the disaster, the embarrassment and shame generated by national mistakes make them too raw for people to confront in any real depth. Lessons, if there are any, have to wait. Vietnam was all but ignored by the media for quite some time following the fall of Saigon, for example, and was hardly mentioned at all during the presidential campaign of 1976. 1 Popular culture was equally reticent: no major fi lm dealt with the reality of the war until 1979, and then not again until 1986. The uninformed newcomer to the United States in the mid-1970s could have been forgiven for being unaware that any tragic, unnecessary war had just been fought in Southeast Asia.
It is in these periods, however, that beliefs about such events solidify and narratives coalesce, if in private. Few people ever change the positions at which they subconsciously arrive during these seemingly Preface and Acknowledgments
